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Retroactivity of Laws: An Illustration of

Intertemporal Conflicts Law Issues through the
Revised Civil Code Articles on Disinherison
"Time is always necessary in the law."'
I. INTRODUCTION

The problem of conflicts of laws in time is not novel; rather, the
law that concerns this problem has a history as deep and rich as that
of the written law itself.2 Although "[c]onventional views of legal
change emphasize the values of certainty and reliance, and are
therefore hostile to explicitly retroactive laws,"3 the frequency with
which these conflicts arise is steadily increasing. The cause of this
development is the exponential growth in new legislation over the
past twenty years.4
The law of retroactivity of laws, also called "intertemporal
conflicts" law, is highly complex, implicating a variety of federal and
state constitutional concerns including the Contracts Clause, the
Takings Clause, and the Due Process Clause as well as the
comparable provisions of the state constitution. The law of
retroactivity of laws affects a variety ofsubstantive law areas and has
the potential of divesting individuals of vested property rights.
Retroactive law-making challenges the presumptions underlying
democracy and the fundamentals ofcivilized andjust societies.' That
is, individuals in such societies conform their behavior and carry out
transactions in accordance with legislation. When new legislation is
Copyright 2002, by LOUISIANA LAWREViEW

1. Rebecca R. French, Time in the Law, 72 U. Colo. L. Rev. 663 (2001).
2. It is also important to note that the antipathy for retroactive laws likewise
has an ancient history dating back to the Greeks. For a discussion of such history,
see Elmer E. Smead, The Rule Against RetroactiveLegislation:A BasicPrinciple
ofJurisprudence,20 Minn. L. Rev. 775 (1936).
3. Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations,and Reparations,99 Colum. L.

Rev. 1657 (1999).
4. J.-R. Trahan, Time for a Change: A Call to Reform Louisiana's
IntertemporalConflicts Law (Law of Retroactivityof Laws), 59 La. L. Rev. 663,
665 (1999) (citing Frangoise Dekeuwer-Drfossez, Les Dispositions Transitoires
dans la Legislation Civile Contemporaine § 1,at 2 (1977); Jacques Ghestin & Gilles

Goubeaux, Traitd de Droit Civil: Introduction Gdnrrale §330, at 293 (3d ed. 1990)
(J.-R. Trahan trans.); I Philippe Malaurie & Laurent Aynrs, Cours de Droit Civil:
Introduction i l'Etude de Droit § 63 1, at 203-04 (2d ed. 1994)).
5. See generallyHarold J. Krent, The PuzzlingBoundary Between Criminal
and Civil RetroactiveLawmaking, 84 Geo. L. J. 2143 (1996); Andrew C. Weiler,
.Has Due Process Struck Out? The Judicial Rubberstamping of Retroactive
Economic Laws, 42 Duke L. J. 1069 (1993).
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enacted, notions of how individuals are to conduct themselves and
affairs is disrupted. Certainty and stability in the law is preferred.
Individuals expect to be able to rely on established law without any
rights potentially being affected. In sum, retroactive laws meddle
with already-established legal interests and rights.
The current intertemporal conflicts law is flawed with a variety of
deficiencies, the most significant being the lack of an official
definition of retroactivity and standards for the courts to employ in
the determination of intertemporal conflicts law issues. The lack of
such guidance has prompted much scholarly commentary and debate
amongst members of the legal communities of both common law and
civil law systems. An assortment of solutions has been proposed in
each system to address the current deficiencies. These proposals will
be analyzed in this comment.
The plan of this comment is as follows. Part II considers and
examines intertemporal conflicts law in the abstract, explicating the
two sets of intertemporal law rules. It discusses the basic rules of
retroactivity including civil law solutions, common law solutions, and
the solutions adopted by the authors of Louisiana's Civil Code article
6.6 Furthermore, it examines the constitutional rules of intertemporal
law that limit the power of the legislature to impose retroactive
effects, in particular, the Due Process Clauses of the federal and state
constitutions.
Part III provides a concrete (and timely) illustration of the
complexities and deficiencies in this law and how the proposed
solutions fare substantively, one based on the recent re-enactment in
Louisiana of the law of "disinherison." The intertemporal issues
presented by the re-enactment of that law are tangibly and practically
suited for this purpose because sorting out those issues requires
consideration of both the basic intertemporal law and the
constitutional constraints on legislative retroactivity. Temporal
conflicts created by the re-enactment of that law are a particularly
useful illustrative device because many ofthe possible cases to which
the new law might be applied fall into the hardest category of
intertemporal cases to solve-those that involve a "dispersion of the
facts." This new legislation also serves as a useful vehicle for
illustrating proposed solutions to problems associated with basic
intertemporal law (Louisiana Civil Code article 6) and constitutional
intertemporal law. This illustration of the retroactive application of
law through the substantive area of Louisiana successions law,
6. La. Civ. Code art. 6 provides, "In the absence of contrary legislative
Procedural and
expression, substantive laws apply prospectively only.
interpretative laws apply both prospectively and retroactively, unless there is a
legislative expression to the contrary."
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specifically the law on disinherison, will provide a civilian analysis
to a recurring legal problem that jurists, attorneys, academics, and
citizens alike can appreciate.
Finally, Part IV of the comment stresses the importance ofthe law
of retroactivity of laws. In addition, it encourages further
comprehensive studies and analyses in this area to foster smoother
transitions in the law.
II. INTERTEMPORAL LAW

A. Explication ofthe Two Sets ofIntertemporalLaw Rules
Before any discussion of the permissibility of the retroactive
application of any new law is possible, a critical examination and
analysis of the law of retroactivity of laws itself is required.
Intertemporal law involves two sets of rules: basic rules and
constitutional rules. The basic rules are used to determine whether
the legislature wanted the new law to be applied retroactively.
Legislative intent and direction controls this set of rules. The
constitutional rules implicated by intertemporal law set limitations on
the power of the legislature to impose retroactive effects.
Two questions arise in the analysis of the permissibility of the
retroactive application of a particular law. The criterion for
identifying retroactive application of the law is somewhat of a "twopronged" test. One must not conflate the two prongs for they are
completely conceptually distinct from one another. The first question
to be analyzed is if the new law is applied to this particular situation,
would this in fact qualify as a retroactive application of the law? If
the answer to this question is no, then there is no intertemporal
conflicts law problem. If the answer is yes, then one must proceed to
the second prong of the test: given that applying the new law to this
situation would qualify as a retroactive application, is it then
permissible to do so? It is at this level that constitutional provisions
are implicated. This two-prong test is to be applied to every
retroactivity problem regardless of the substantive area of the law.
B. Basic Rules
The basic rules of intertemporal law have one objective and one
objective only: to determine whether the legislature wished for the
new law to be applied retroactively. If the legislature clearly directed
retroactive application of the law, then the "basic rules" analysis is at
an end. But, if the legislature did not, then legislative intent as to
retroactivity must be reconstructed. In reconstructing the legislature's
intent, there is a general default rule: presume that the legislature
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wanted no retroactivity. There is an exception, however, in reference
to procedural and interpretative legislation. Procedural law is the set
of rules that prescribe the steps for having a right or duty judicially
enforced; procedural law contrasts with substantive law which defines
the specific rights or duties themselves. Interpretative law is the body
of law that ascertains the meaning of laws.
1. The GeneralRule: Presume the LegislatureWanted No
Retroactivity
The default rule in retroactivity of law examinations is to presume
that the legislature did not intend or want the legislation to apply
retroactively.7 The most difficult problem of intertemporal law has
been devising a definition of retroactivity and establishing criterion
for retroactivity versus prospectivity. Without such concrete
guidelines, intertemporal law issues will continue to plague
legislatures and courts alike.
a. CivilLaw Solutions
In most, ifnot all, civil law jurisdictions other than Louisiana, the
"basic" rule (unlike the basic rules in common law jurisdictions and
in Louisiana) is relatively uncomplicated: when there is ambiguity as
to whether the legislature (or law-making body) intended for the law
to be retroactively applied, the civil law default rule is that the law is
to be applied prospectively only. This rule, obviously enough, is
identical to the general rule of Louisiana Civil Code article 6, of
which it is, in fact, the source. Under this civil law rule, as under the
general rule of article 6, distinguishing "retroactive" from
"prospective" applications is critically important. A variety of
definitions of or criteria for identifying retroactivity has arisen within
the civil law traditions.
(i) TraditionalTheories
(aa) Vested Rights
The theory of vested rights' dominated civilian intertemporal
conflicts law until the early part ofthis century. The leading works
on the theory include those of Merlin and Savigny.9 In Henryv. Jean,
7.
8.
be used
9.

La. Civ. Code art. 6.
Also referred to as the theory ofacquired rights. Acquired and vested can
interchangeably.
10 Phillippe Antoine Merlin, Rdpertoire Universel et Raisonn6 de
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the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that a retrospective or retroactive
law is defined as one which takes away or impairs vested rights
acquired under existing laws or creates a new obligation, imposes a
new duty or attaches a new disability with respect to transactions or
considerations already passed. 0 This definition seems to be
indistinguishable from that associated with the civilian theory of
vested rights." A right is vested when "the right to enjoyment,
present or prospective, has become theProperty of some particular
person or persons as a present interest."' Thus, a vested right is both
a property or patrimonial right 3 and a present right.
The concept of vested rights has been criticized for decades by a
variety of scholars.' 4 The notion of vested rights is so vague and
poorly defined that it could easily be inaccurately applied should one
equate a mere right with a vested right. A vested right is one that has
been fully realized. There is a stark contrast in a right that has not yet
been fully realized (what is merely an expectation) and a vested
right. 5 For courts to apply the notion of vested rights when they are
dealing with mere expectations results in tremendous inaccuracy and
inconsistency in the analysis of retroactive application of the law.
Another problem with the theory is that, because of its exclusive
focus on the acquisition and loss of rights, it fails to account for cases
in status, for example, changes in the definition of
involving changes
"majority."' 6 Such changes can sometimes produce a more
significant economic loss than would the deprivation of a vested
right. Perhaps the most serious defect of the theory is the lack of
correspondence or conformity between the solutions it prescribes and
the solutions arrived at by the courts.' 7
Jurisprudence 1-90 (5th ed. 1826); 8 Friedrich Carl de Savigny, Trait6 de Droit
Romain §§ 383-400, at 363-528 (Charles Guenoux trans. 1851).
10. 238 La.314, 115 So.2d 363, 367 (1959).
11. Trahan, supra note 4, at 688.
12. Id. at 689-90 (quoting Terrebone v. South Lafourche Tidal Control, 445 So.
2d 1221, 1224 n.9 (La. 1984) (quoting Tennant v. Russell, 214 La. 1046, 1052, 39
So. 2d 726, 728 (1949)); DOTD v. McClendon, 552 So. 2d, 1220, 1221 (La. App.
5th Cir. 1989).
13. Id. at 690, 742. A patrimonial right is a right that is susceptible of
pecuniary value or a right to which a dollar value can be readily attached.
14. Id. at 711-12; Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the
ConstitutionalityofRetroactive Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 692, 696; James L.
Kainen, The HistoricalFrameworkfor Reviving ConstitutionalProtectionfor
Propertyand ContractRights, 79 Corn. L. Rev. 87, 114 (1993); Bryant Smith,
Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 5 Tex. L. Rev. 231, 246 (1927).
15. For example, in successions law, succession rights and forced heirship
rights do not vest until the moment of the testator's death. Until such time, these
rights are merely expectations.
16. Trahan, supranote 4, at 742.
17. Id. at 723. There are also a number of other deficiencies of the vested
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(bb) Completed Acts
The theory of completed acts arose in Germany in response to
Napoleonic legislation. Immediate repercussions were felt in France
and Italy. 8 The theory of completed acts maintains that acts
completed while the old law was in effect are governed by that law,
whereas those completed after the imposition of the new law are
governed by that law. As a result, executory contracts, born under the
dominion of the prior law, are forever governed by it. 9
The theory asserts that retroactivity involves the timing of a
particular act or other event to which a statute attaches juridical
consequences.20
This is what civil law scholars call the
"presupposition" (presupposi, supuesto), "hypothesis" (hypoth~se,
ipotesis), or "juridical facts" (faitsjuridiques,Tatbestand). In other
words, where the presupposed act or event occurs after the effective
date ofthe new statute, the proposed application cannot be considered
retroactive. Conversely, where the presupposed act or event occurs
before the effective date of the new statute, the proposed application
may and, under some circumstances, should be considered
retroactive. 2' In sum, the theory of the completed act proposes that
what matters is to find out not if a right has been acquired, but if an
act has been realized during the reign of the old law, because laws
operate directly on acts by assigning juridical consequences to them.22
Like the theory ofvested rights, the completed acts theory is also
not without fault.23 It, too, is extremely vague in that it pinpoints
retroactivity to the time(s) at which the acts or other events that
compose the "presupposition" (or "hypothesis") as opposed to the
"consequence" (or "effect") of the new law. It is often difficult to
determine what acts or events should be considered part of the
presupposition. Furthermore, because the theory focuses on
"completed" acts, it is not well suited to handle those cases in which
a "dispersion of facts" occurs. The facts are dispersed in time when
some events that the presupposition entails occur before the new law
becomes effective and some occur after the new law becomes
effective. Likewise, this theory is not the best-suited theory to resolve
rights theory, the scope ofwhich is much too broad for this comment. See generally
Trahan, supranote 4.
18. 1Guilliermo A. Borda, Tratado de Derecho Civil: Parte General § 166, at
182. (J.-R. Trahan trans. 1999).
19. Id.

20. Trahan, supranote 4, at 695 (citations omitted).

21. Id.
22. Id. citing Ignacio Galindo Garfias, Derecho Civil: Parte General § 76, at
169.
23. See generallyTrahan, supra, note 4.
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retroactivity problems that are still in the course of effect, that is,
producing effects at the moment the new law intervenes.
(ii) Modern Theory: Roubier
The reigning civil law alternative on this subject is the work of
Paul Roubier 4 Whereas most other theories on retroactivity focus
on "rights" or "acts," Roubier's system revolves around the notion of
the "juridical situation." According to Roubier, a juridical situation
is a complex of rights and duties.25 He asserts that "every law is made
in order to determine a certain number ofjuridical situations in favor
of or against certain persons. Thus, it is in their action vis-a-vis past,
present, or future juridical situations that the action of laws in time is
summed up."2 6 In other words, what possible applications of a new
statute qualify as retroactive depends on how those applications
would affect the "juridical situations" at which that statute is aimed."
In Roubier's scheme, each juridical situation has two distinct
phases: "a dynamic phase, which corresponds to the time of the
constitution of the situation and also its extinction"2 and "a static
phase which corresponds to the time at which the situation produces
its effects."29 Unlike other theories, Roubier's system encompasses
three temporal effects. The retroactive effect occurs when the new
law goes back before the day of its promulgation (goes back to the
past). The immediate effect is the application of the law in the
present. Finally, the deferred effect (survival of the old law) occurs
when the new law "lets the old law be applied for all the juridical
effects that are still to come from acts that occurred prior to the new
law's promulgation."3
b. Common Law Solutions
Common law definitions of retroactivity have arisen from the
works of scholars and the judicial opinions of America's courts.
Such definitions include: "[A] retroactive statute is one which gives
to preenactment conduct a different legal effect from that which it

24. Paul Roubier, Le Droit Transitoire: Conflicts des Lois Lans le Temps(2d.
1960) [hereinafter "Roubier, Le Droit Transitoire"].

25. Paul Roubier, DroitsSubjectifs et SituationsJuridiques52, 53 (1963).
26. Roubier, Le Droit Transitoire, supra note 24, at 181.
27. J.-R. Trahan on the theory of Roubier (unpublished work on file with the
author).

28. Roubier, supra note 24, at 182.

29. Id.

30. Roubier, Le Droit Transitoire, supra note 24, at 177-81.
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would have had without the passage of the statute;",3' "[O]ne which
reaches back to attach new legal rights and duties to already
completed transactions; 32 "All changes in government policy...
impose gains and losses on those who, prior to the change, had taken
actions with long-term consequences; ' '33 and "A law is retroactive if
it alters the legal status of acts that were performed before it came
into existence., 34 Retroactive Law by Stephen Munzer discusses a
variety of theories of retroactive law.35 The first he examines is the
declaratory theory (Blackstonian retroactivity) that is dependent on
the view expressed by Blackstone that courts merely declare the law,
never create it.36 Under this theory, if a court overrules an earlier
decision, it does no more than declare what the law has always been
and applies this law to the case at hand. Another theory of
retroactivity is the changed response theory. It views retroactive law
as merely altering the instructions given to legal officials regarding
things that happened in the past. "A very different theory, intended
to cover retroactive legislation as well as retroactive decisional law,
sensibly holds that a law is retroactive if it applies to an act done
before the law came into existence. 37
2. Exceptions: Procedural& InterpretativeLegislation
The general rule of the law of retroactivity of laws is to presume
that the legislature did not want the law to be retroactively applied.
There is, however, an exception to this general rule. Thus, the
presumption against retroactivity is one that is rebuttable. The
exception involves procedural and interpretative legislation.
Louisiana Civil Code article 6 provides that "procedural and
interpretative laws apply both prospectively and retroactively, unless
there is a legislative expression to the contrary." Thus, a procedural
or interpretative law will be applied retroactively if the legislature
does not express an intention otherwise.
To reiterate, aprocedural law prescribes the steps required to have
a right or dutyjudicially enforced. Procedural law is distinct from the
substantive law that defines the specific rights or duties themselves.
31. Hochman, supranote 14, at 692.
32. Id. at 692 (quoting Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Board of Comm'rs, 258
U.S. 338, 42 S. Ct. 325 (1922)).
33. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L.
Rev. 509 (1986).
34. Stephen R. Munzer, RetroactiveLaw, 6 J. Legal Stud. 373 (1977).
35. Id.
36. See 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 69-70
(1965).
37. Munzer, supranote 34, at 377.
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Procedural laws generally govern burdens of proof, evidence,
prescription, rules of trials, juries, venue, and rules on motions and
pleadings.38 An interpretative law ascertains the meaning of laws.
An interpretative law does not create new rights and duties but
simply determines the meaning of existing laws. In other words, an
interpretative law merely establishes the meaning that an interpreted
statute or law had from the time of its enactment. "It is the original
statute, not the interpretative one, that establishes rights and duties."'3 9
The legislature may state through interpretative laws what other laws
are actually meant to accomplish or achieve. An example of an
interpretative law is Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2794 in that it
describes a standard of conduct determining more precisely the
meaning of certain kinds of fault by certain classes of defendants.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2794 determined professional
negligence, imprudence, and want of skill by medical generalists and
specialists, who were originally responsible for damage occasioned
by such fault under Louisiana Civil Code articles 2315 and 2316.40
C. ConstitutionalRules
1. Enumeration
Retroactivity considerations implicate various provisions ofboth
the U.S. and Louisiana Constitutions.4' Such federal provisions
include the Contracts Clause, 42 the Takings Clause, 43 and the Due

38. An example of a procedural law associated with the new legislation on
disinherison will help to illustrate. Some of the changes instituted with the revised
Civil Code articles on disinherison are minor procedural changes in the law. One
such change involves the uncorroborated testimony of the disinherited heir that the
blameworthy act or conduct in question did not really occur. In this area of the law,
there is a rebuttable presumption that what is recorded in the executed act of
disinherison is true. Previously, before the law was inadvertently repealed, the
uncorroborated testimony of the heir to the contrary was enough to rebut this
presumption. However, under the new legislation, this is not sufficient. The
question arises, did the legislature want this procedural law to be retroactively
applied? In accordance with the text of Louisiana Civil Code article 6, it is
presumed that the legislature did want procedural and interpretative law to be
retroactively applied, for there is no legislative expression to the contrary.
39. Ardoin v. Hartford Acc. & Indemn. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331, 1339 (La. 1978).
40. Id. at 1339.
41. See generally Edward S. Stimson, Retroactive Application of Law-A
Problem in ConstitutionalLaw, 38 Mich. L. Rev. 30 (1939).
42. "No state shall ...pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts
... U.S.. Const. art. I, § 10.
43. ". . . nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. Const. amend. VI.
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Process Clause."
The comparable Louisiana constitutional
provisions include the Prohibited Laws Clause,45 the Right to
Property Clause,46 and the Due Process Clause.47 The U.S.
Constitution prohibits "ex post facto" laws in the criminal realm;
thus, no criminal laws can be retroactively applied. Because the
Contracts Clause and Takings Clause are limited to specific areas of
the law and to specific situations within those areas, most of the
discussion on retroactivity has revolved around the Due Process
Clause and those rights of individuals that are to be protected. The
interests largely at issue are those that are of an economic nature.48
Historically, most retroactivity problems focused largely on an
economic aspect of life through some right. This trend continues
with an even greater frequency today.
While the Due Process Clause is definitely the most general
provision ofthe three, it was not written to govern retroactive versus
nonretroactive applications of the law nor does it specifically speak
to the manner in which the courts should determine whether to
retroactively apply a law. 4' However, in the absence of a
constitutional clause on the permissibility of the retroactive
application of the law in the civil context, the Due Process Clause
44. "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law... " U.S. Const.
amend. XIV.
45. "No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be enacted." La. Const. art. I, § 23 (1974).
46. "Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its political
subdivisions except for public purposes and with just compensation paid to the
owner or into court for his benefit... Personal effects shall be never taken..." La.
Const. art. I, § 4 (1974).
47. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due
process of law." La. Const. art. I, § 2 (1974).
48. Krent, supra note 5, at 2148-52.
49. According to Professor J. Randall Trahan in a speech entitled "Conflicts of
Laws in Time: A CriticalOverview" delivered to the Louisiana Judicial College,
June 2001, "Though these constitutional provisions admittedly have some
connection with the temporal effects of new legislation, they are not, however, part
of the intertemporal law, properly so called. Two of the provisions, the Contracts
Clause and the Takings Clause, are of limited scope: the former applies only to new
laws that pertain to 'contract law,' the latter, only to new laws that pertain to
'property law.' And none of the three-not even the Due Process Clause-has as its
sole purpose the resolution of conflicts of laws in time. The real thrust of each of
these provisions is in other directions." For example, the direction ofthe Takings
Clause is in its protection of private property against governmental encroachment.
Likewise, the direction of the Contracts Clause is specifically to protect the
impairment of obligations by the government. Professor Trahan further asserts that
"[t]o the extent that the provisions regulate successions laws at all, they do so
indirectly and only as an incident to their primary functions."
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seems to be the only way in which to proceed with an analysis of such
subject. Indeed, the tests for constitutional permissibility of
retroactive applications of law are modeled on the due process
standard.
2. The Test: When Does Retroactive Application ofNew
Legislation ViolateDue Process?
The test to determine ifa law is to be constitutionally retroactively
applied depends on whether the retroactive application of that new
law violates the Due Process Clause. The older test employed by the
United States Supreme Court focused on the "vested rights" theory.
The traditional principle invoked in determining the constitutionality
of retroactive legislation was that a statute could not abrogate vested
rights." The prohibition against retroactive laws protected against
substantive legislative interference only those interests, as defined by
pre-existing law, that had "vested."'" Review of economic legislation
under the Due Process Clause had its roots in the Lochnerera where
the courts were less likely to apply laws retroactively." This older
test based on the vested rights theory to determine if a retroactive
application would violate due process was very similar to the
traditional civil law criterion for retroactivity.
With time, the Lochner approach came to be replacedby the
"rational basis test" beginning in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish54 and
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc." The new test is a
"rational means-ends" test that asks if the chosen legislative end (that
the law be retroactively applied) bears a rational relationship to the
attainment of some legitimate state objective. The U.S. Supreme
Court, in applying the Due Process Clause in Usery v. TurnerElkhorn
MiningCo., stressed that "legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and
benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of
constitutionality."" The presumption applies even if the legislation
"upsets otherwise settled expectations... [or] impose[s] a new duty or
liability based on past acts."58 The U.S. Supreme Court has only
required a standard of reasonableness in retroactive applications by
50. Hochman, supra note 14, at 696.
51. Kainen, supranote 14, at 105.
52. Krent, supranote 5, at 2150; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S. Ct.

539 (1905).
53.

See generally, Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudenceand the

American ConstitutionalTradition, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 1(1991).
54. 300 U.S. 379, 57 S. Ct. 578 (1937).
55. 348 U.S. 483, 75 S.Ct. 461 (1955).
56. 428 U.S. 1,96 S. Ct. 2882 (1976).
57. Krent, supra note 5, at 2150 (quoting Usery, 428 U.S. at 15-16).

58. Id.
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stating, "[p]rovided that the retroactive application of a statute is
supported by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational
meansjudgments about the wisdom of such legislation remain within
the exclusive province of the legislative and executive branches." 59
Despite the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has moved from the
vested rights theory test to the rational means test, Louisiana courts
continue to use the old test. While this is permissible for
interpretation of the Due Process Clause contained in the Louisiana
constitution because state courts are the final arbitrators of its laws'
meaning, this is not adequate for interpretation of the federal Due
Process Clause, as to which federal courts are the final arbiters of
meaning.
III. ILLUSTRATION: ANALYSIS OF INTERTEMPORAL ISSUES
PRESENTED BY THE REENACTMENT OF THE CIVIL CODE ARTICLES

ON DISINHERISON

A. Background on LouisianaSuccessions Law: Disinherison
1. Explication ofDisinherison
Disinherison is the means of depriving an undeserving heir of his
forced portion. 60 The concept of disinherison was received from
Roman law into Spain and France.6 "The inclusion of Spanish law
in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808 is intensely important so far as
disinherison is concerned because all the evidence points to the
[conclusion] that the rules and causes for disinheritance were adopted
from Las Siete Partidasin
from Spanish
62 sources in general-and
particular.,
When included as part of the Louisiana Civil Codes of 1808,
1825, and 1870, "the grounds [for disinherison] were basically those
stated in Justinian's 115th Novel,6 3 with the addition ofthe ground of
59. Id. at 2150-51 (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co.,
467 U.S. 717, 729-30, 104 S.Ct. 2709, 2717-18 (1984)).
60. Frederick William Swaim & Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Louisiana Civil
Law Treatise, Successions and Donations § 11.14 (1995).
61. Leonard Oppenheim, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, Successions and
Donations § 66 (1973).
62. Id. § 67, at 152.
63. A child could be disinherited if he (1) assaulted his father; (2) held him up

to public disgrace; (3)prosecuted him for any crime but treason; (4) informed
against him to his danger; (5) attempted his life; (6) committed adultery with his

father's wife; (7) prevented him from making a will; (8) refused to be his bail; (9)
refused to redeem him from captivity; (10) neglected him, if he became insane. A
son could be passed over if (11) he engaged in witchcraft; (12) became an actor or
gladiator, unless his parents were of that class; (13) became a heretic. A daughter
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marrying during minority without parental consent."" The ten
grounds listed in the early Louisiana Codes remained unchanged until
1983 when the ground of the child's conviction of a felony for which
he could be subjected to life imprisonment or death was added.65
Initially, testators were not very successful in attempts to disinherit
their descendants. Subsequently, a number of legislative changes
enhanced the likelihood of a successful disinherison.
The Louisiana law of successions and donations dramatically
changed during the past eleven years.66 In 1997, the Louisiana
Legislature adopted an Act calling for a massive revision of over half
of the law of successions. In response, the Louisiana State Law
Institute revised the law and the legislature enacted the new
legislation proposed by the Institute. Inadvertently, by Act 1421 of
1997, effective July 1, 1999, the legislature repealed all but one of the
Louisiana Civil Code articles67 pertaining to the law of disinherison.
The remaining references to disinherison appeared in article 1494
which provides that a forced heir may only be deprived ofhis legitime
if the "decedent has just cause to disinherit him."6" Despite this
reference, the articles dealing with the procedure and formalities of
disinherison and the causes of disinherison were no longer in the
Code.6 9
Discovery ofthe repeal occurred in January 1999, prompting the
proposal of two bills to the 1999 Legislature. However, neither bill
was enacted. As such, the legislature adjourned on June 21, 1999
without taking action to reenact the Civil Code articles on
disinherison. Thus, for a period of two years, no such law existed.70
To fill this void, the legislature, on recommendation of the
Louisiana State Law Institute, enacted Act 573 (H.B. No. 361)
Successions-Disinherison of Forced Heirs in the 2001 Regular
might be disinherited if she (14) became a prostitute or married a freedman without
her parents' consent, unless they had themselves neglected to provide for her
marriage. See Radin, Handbook of Roman Law 44, § 165, at 292 n.5 (1927).
64. Swaim & Lorio, supranote 60, at 291-92.
65. Id. at 292. The twelfth ground was added in 1985. A parent may disinherit
a forced heir ifthe child has known how to contact the parent, but has failed without
just cause to communicate with the parent for a period of two years after attaining
the age of majority, except when the child is on active duty in the military forces of
the United States.
66. Changes occurred in both the substantive law of successions and its

procedural law such as formalities, burdens and standards ofproof, etc.
67. La. Civ. Code arts. 1617-1624.
68. Swaim & Lorio, supranote 60, at 49 (Supp. 2000).

69. Id.

70. This two year period of time extended from July 1, 1999 through July 1,
2001. This period oftime will be referred to as the "interim period" throughout the
length of this comment.
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Session. The Act is comprised of Civil Code articles 1617 through
1626, and includes a retroactivity clause, Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:2502, relative to successions, which provides:
A. If a person dies after the effective date of this Act
leaving an instrument in the form of a testament that
was executed prior to the effective date of this Act,
then a disinherison in that instrument that would be
valid under the provisions ofCivil Code Articles 1617
through 1626 shall be governed by the provisions of
those Articles.
B. If the disinherison would not be valid under the
provisions of Civil Code Articles 1617 through 1626,
the disinherison shall be governed by the law in effect
at the time of the execution of the instrument.
Like the legislation on disinherison that was inadvertently
repealed, the new legislation on disinherison provides that forced
heirs are deprived of their legitime if they are disinherited by the
testator for just cause in the manner prescribed in the Civil Code.7
The new legislation stipulates the formalities for disinherison and
restricts the causes for disinherison by parents and grandparents to
enumerated grounds.72 But revised article 1621 reduces the number
ofcauses for which a testator may disinherit a forced heir from twelve
to eight. Act 573 provides for reconciliation between the testator and
the forced heir(s) in addition to providing defenses for disinherison.

71. La. Civ. Code art. 1617.
72. La Civ. Code art. 1621. A parent has just cause to disinherit a child if: (1)
The child has raised his hand to strike a parent, or has actually struck a parent; but
a mere threat is not sufficient; (2) The child has been guilty, towards a parent, of
cruel treatment, crime, or grievous injury; (3) The child has attempted to take the
life of a parent; (4) The child, without any reasonable basis, has accused a parent
of committing a crime for which the law provides that the punishment could be life
imprisonment or death; (5) The child has used any act of violence or coercion to
hinder a parent from making a testament; (6) The child, being a minor, has married
without the consent of the parent; (7) The child has been convicted of a crime for
which the law provides that the punishment could be life imprisonment or death;
(8) The child, after attaining the age of majority and knowing how to contact the
parent, has failed to communicate with the parent withoutjust cause for a period of
two years, unless the child was on active duty in any of the military forces of the
United States at the time. La. Civ. Code art. 1622 (2001).
A grandparent may disinherit his grandchild for any of the causes, other
than the sixth, expressed in the preceding Article, whenever the offending act has
been committed against a parent or a grandparent. He may also disinherit the
grandchild for the seventh cause expressed in the preceding Article.
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2. Competing Theories on the Law Duringthe InterimPeriod
A controversy exists on what exactly the law was in the interim
period between the inadvertent repeal of the old law, effective July 1,
1999 and the enactment of the new law, effective July 1,2001. The
comments to Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2502 reveal that the
legislature was aware of the dispute amongst the legal community as
to what was the law during this period of time. Comment (b) states,
The bigger problem . . . is what law applies to
testaments executed on or after July 1, 1999, and
before the effective date of the new Act. There is
considerable disagreement over the law in that time
period. This transitional rule does not solve the
problem, but it provides an opening to the court to
conclude that, if the disinherison was valid when
executed, it would be valid even though the person
dies after the 2001 Revision of Civil Code Articles is
enacted and the new rules may be different.
Repeal of the articles on disinherison has created speculation
ranging from the obvious conclusion that the repeal eliminates all
grounds for disinherison to the opposing conclusion that the repeal
permits the parent to disinherit a forced heir for any cause that, in
view of the circumstances of the case, might be regarded as "just."73
Two dominant theories74 have emerged in the midst of this debate,
both of which implicate Louisiana Constitutional Article XII, §
5(B).75
73. Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Remnants of Forced Heirship: The
Interrelationshipof Undue Influence, What's Become of Disinherison,and the
UnfinishedBusinessofthe StepparentUsufruct,60 La. L. Rev. 637,655-56 (2000).
74. It may be asserted that the courts could devise rules to govern the lacuna
created by the repeal utilizing the powers granted to them by La. Civ. Code art. 4.
See also Frangois Grny, Methode d'Interprrtation Et Sources En Droit Priv6
Positif, 1954, (Louisiana State Law Institute trans.); Jardo Mayda, Franqois Grny
and Modem Jurisprudence (1978).
La. Civ. Code art. 4 provides, "When no rule for a particular situation can
be derived from legislation or custom, the court is bound to proceed according to
equity. To decide equitably, resort is made to justice, reason, and prevailing
usages." In furtherance ofsuch argument, it would be asserted that the lacuna could
be filled with exactly the law that was repealed because the Civil Code articles
were, after all, inadvertently repealed. However, by virtue of Article XII, Section
5 ofthe Louisiana Constitution, the power to determine the grounds for disinherison
resides with the legislature and not with the courts. Thus, the courts are not free to
fill this lacuna. See supra, note 73 and infra, note 75.
75. La. Const. art. XII, § 5 (1974) provides, "The determination of forced heirs,
the amount of the forced portion and the grounds for disinherison shall be provided

1336

6LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 62

a. The Yiannopoulos and Spaht Theory: Repeal EliminatesAll
Groundsfor Disinherison
Professor A. N. Yiannopoulos7 6 ofTulane University School of Law
asserts in an Editor's Note to the Special Millennium Edition ofthe 2000
Louisiana Civil Code: "In dismantling the civil law of successions, the
Successions Revision Committee of the Louisiana State Law Institute
repealed Article 1621. As a result, the 'unless' clause of Article 1494"7
is now devoid of meaning and a testator may no longer disinherit a
forced heir."78
Others agree. Based upon the history of disinherison in Louisiana
and the constitutional mandate requiring the grounds of disinherison to
be provided by law,79 Professor Katherine Spaht8° argues the better view
is that all ofthe provisions ofthe law ofdisinherison have been repealed.
Thus, a forced heir may no longer be disinherited.8 She acknowledges
that Louisiana Civil Code article 1494 still mentioned disinherison, but
asserts that without the repealed articles to give content to those words
in article 1494, the words have no independent meaning.
Both scholars argue that re-establishment of the twelve grounds by
the courts as 'just causes' of disinherison under article 1494 would be
judicial legislation forbidden by Article II, §282 of the Louisiana
Constitution." Furthermore, both observe that the power to provide
grounds for disinherison resides with the legislature, not the courts, in
fulfilling its "legislative function to mold and implement the legal
institution of forced heirship without thwarting or destroying the
fundamental and enduring rights, principle, or purposes that such
function encompasses. "814
by law..."
76. Eason-Weinmann Professor of Comparative Law, Tulane University School
of Law.
77. Article 1494 of the La. Civil Code provides, "A forced heir may not be
deprived of the portion of the decedent's estate reserved to him by law, called the

legitime, unless the decedent has just cause to disinherit him."
at 290.
78. Id.
79. La. Const. art. XXII, § 5.

80. Jules F. and Francis L. Landry Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law
Center at LSU.
81. Spaht, supra note 73, at 656-57.
82. La. Const. art. II, § 2 (1974) provides, "Except as otherwise provided by
this constitution, no one of these branches, nor any person holding office in one of
them, shall exercise power belonging to either of the others."
83. Spaht, supra note 73 (citing La. Civ. Code art. 1494, Editor's Note by
Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos (Special Millennium Edition), "Article XII, Section
5of the Louisiana Constitution declares that 'the grounds for disinherison shall also
be provided by law,' and the sources of law in Louisiana are legislation and
customs, not judicial decisions.").
84. Id.at 659.
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b. Max Nathan's "BroaderGrounds" Approach
To the contrary, Max Nathan, Jr., argues that the repeal
expanded the scope of the law of disinherison through Civil Code
article 1494 (which was not repealed) so that any number of
conceivable grounds would be appropriate for a testator to effectively
disinherit a forced heir. 6 Nathan pushes for the adoption of his
"Broader Grounds" approach8 7 which is founded on the belief that
although the legislature may have inadvertently repealed these articles
in Act 1421 of 1997, it did not unintentionally leave them repealed as
it had the opportunity to cure what had been done.88 Nathan ponders,
"With article 1494 remaining in full force and effect, and without the
restriction of 'just cause' to the twelve narrow grounds specified in
the past, the question necessarily becomes: what is the meaning of
'just cause' in Civil Code article 1491?,,89 He answers with the
argument that the legislature's rejection of narrowly defining the
grounds for "just cause" suggests an intent not to limit or restrict the
term as it had previously been limited; thus, it is no longer restricted
to an exclusive list thereby allowing parents and grandparents to
effectively
disinherit a child for any reason purporting to be a "just
90
cause."
B. Analysis
1. Examination ofthe Retroactivity Provision
Paragraph A of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2502 is a validating
provision. It states that if a person dies after the effective date of the
act leaving an instrument in the form ofa testament that was executed
prior to the effective date of the act, then a disinherison in that
instrument that would be valid under the provisions of Civil Code
85. President of the Louisiana State Law Institute.
86. Max Nathan, Jr., ForcedHeirship:The Unheralded "New" Disinherison
Rules, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 1027 (2000).
87. Nathan submits three other competing theoretical approaches one could
take in analyzing the issue before asserting that his proposal is the most rationally
based. (The other theories include the "Die-Hard" approach which asserts that a
fbrced heir simply cannot be disinherited unless he is declared unworthy; the "NonRepealer" approach which would have the courts assume that the repeal of the
articles was unintentional and should be ignored or treated as if it did not really
happen, because the repeal of fundamental rules should not be presumed or lightly
implied; and finally, the "Unconstitutional" approach which maintains that the
repeal itself was an unconstitutional act and therefore should be without effect).
88. Nathan, supra note 86, at 1035.
89. Id. at 1036.

90. Id.
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articles 1617 through 1626 shall be governed by the provisions of
those articles. This provision purports to apply the new legislation to
acts of disinherison executed under the old law. Three things are
required for this provision to apply: (1) the testator must die after the
effective date of the new legislation; (2) the act of disinherison must
have been executed before the new legislation; and (3) the execution
of the act of disinherison must be valid under the new law.
Paragraph B states that if the disinherison would not be valid
under the provisions of Civil Code articles 1617 through 1626, then
the disinherison shall be governed by the law in effect at the time of
the execution of the instrument. This provision only applies when the
testator dies after the effective date of the new law. Comment (c) to
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2502 states that the section does not
propose to impose retroactively any rule that would apply to the
interim period between July 1, 1999 and July 1, 2001 to affect
testators who die during that period of time. Though merely doctrinal
comment on the legislation and not law, this comment suggests that
the drafters were only concerned with applying the new law when the
testator dies after the new law became effective. It also means that
the legislature took no position on what to do when the testator dies
before the effective date of the new law, seeming to have left the task
of determining what to do under these circumstances to the courts.
2. Enumeration andExplication of Various Scenarios; The
Standardto Be Applied
It is when the facts are dispersed around the effective date of the
new law that the intertemporal conflicts law problems arise. The
attached chart outlines the thirteen possible scenarios of the
dispersion of facts.9
In all of these cases, the conflicts-of-laws issue that the "basic"
intertemporal law rules are designed to answer-did the legislature
desire retroactive application fo the new law-is, of course,
presented. Where the legislature gave a directive regarding the
temporal application of the law, that is, for those cases in which
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2502 dictates what law is to be applied,
this "basic" issue, obviously enough, is settled. But where the
legislature did not give a directive regarding the temporal application
of the law, that is, for those cases in which Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:2502 does not dictate what law is to be applied, the courts
must apply the rules of Louisiana Civil Code article 6-the general
default rule and its exceptions-to determine what law is to be
91. Please refer to Chart One at the end of this comment throughout this
section.
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applied. To do that, the courts not only must determine whether the
new law(s) in question is (are) substantive, procedural, or interpretive,
but also whether, in each given case, applying that (those) new law(s)
would be "retroactive."
In making this latter determination (that is, in which cases would
the application of the new law be "retroactive"), the courts should, in
the judgment of this author, adopt somewhat ofa hybrid standard that
combines the theory of vested rights with that of the completed acts
theory.92 A hybrid standard would be most beneficial because critical
to such retroactive analysis is both the moment at which the "vested
right" materializes (the forced heirship right) as well as the
temporality of the "completed act" of disinherison (the time of the
execution of the act of disinherison). Here, it is not solely one or the
other that is of significance.
That the "vested rights" approach is appropriate in this context is
clear. In Louisiana successions and donations law, the forced
heirship right vests at the testator's death.93 Thus, the forced heirship
"right" is merely an expectation during the period of time spanning
between the birth of the child and the death of the testator. In other
words, the right is a mere expectation until the parent testator dies.
Because this is so, the "vested rights" approach seems to "fit" cases
that involve changes in the law of forced heirship well.
But the "completed acts" theory "fits" cases of disinherison well.
As has been noted, a disinherison must be made in one of the forms
prescribed for testaments.9" Additionally, the disinherison must be
made expressly and for a just cause; otherwise, it is null.95 Because
of these codal requirements, the act of disinherison and the time in
which it is properly executed is a "completed act" that influences the
determination of retroactive application of the law.
Whereas the "basic" intertemporal conflicts issue is presented in
all thirteen scenarios, "constitutional" intertemporal conflicts issues
are presented only in some of them, namely, those to which the
legislature has directed (either in Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2502
or by virtue of the "exceptions" ofLouisiana Civil Code article 6) that
92. In doing so, it must be recognized that this approach would not be the most
ideal for all retroactive application of law problems. Rather, this would be the most
suitable solution for the current legal dilemma facing the courts in the substantive
area of Louisiana law of successions, specifically disinherison.
93. See La. Civ. Code art. 870.B ("Testate and intestate succession rights,
including the right to claim as a forced heir, are governed by the law in effect on the
date of the decedent's death."); see also Henry v. Jean, 238 La. 314, 115 So. 2d

363, 367 (1959) ("Succession rights do not vest until the death of the decedent.");
Succession of Doll v. Doll, 593 So. 2d 1239, 1255 (La. 1992).
94. La. Civ. Code art. 1618.
95. La. Civ. Code art. 1619.
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the new legislation on disinherison be applied. In these cases,
courts must use at least two different approaches to address the
problem:
(i) to determine whether the proposed retroactive
application would violate the Due Process Clause of the state
constitution, they must use the old "vested rights" theory; (ii) to
determine whether the proposed retroactive application would violate
the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution, they must use the
newer "rational ends-means" test.
3. Examinationof the DispersionofFacts Cases
a. Case 1
(i) Basic rules
The legislature did not give a directive regarding temporal
application to Case 1 on the chart. To determine the legislature's
wishes, one must, then, resort to Louisiana Civil Code article 6.
The threshold question is whether applying the new law in such
a case would be to apply it retroactively. The answer to this question
is clearly "yes." That is so because in Case 1,all of the pertinent acts
(the blameworthy conduct or cause for disinherison, the execution of
the act of disinherison, and the death of the testator) occur during the
interim period. Thus, the pertinent right-forced heirship-vests or
does not vest, as the case might be, before the new law takes effect
and the pertinent act-the drafting of the act of disinherison---occurs
before the new law takes effect.
The next issue to be addressed in the basic rules analysis is how
should the legislation be classified. Is the new legislation on
disinherison substantive, procedural, or interpretive? The new law is
substantive because it creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties,
and powers of parties. In this instance, the Civil Code articles on
disinherison create, define, and regulate the rights, duties, and powers
of the parent testator and the forced heir. The forced heir is entitled
to his legitime, only to be denied it if there is just cause for a
disinherison and the parent testator follows the proper procedure to
effectively execute a valid act of disinherison. The new legislation
creates, defines, and regulates the respective rights of each party.
Because the new legislation is substantive rather than procedural or
interpretive, it should be presumed that the legislature did not want
a retroactive application of the new legislation.96

96.

La. Civ. Code art. 6.
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(ii) Constitutionalrules
In this case no "constitutional" problem is presented. That is so
because, as has just been explained, the legislature has directed, albeit
through the default rule of LouisianaCivil Code article 6, that new
law not to be applied to this case.
b. Case2
(i) Basic rules
The legislature gave a directive regarding the temporal
application of the new law in Case 2. This case is the situation
presented when the blameworthy conduct occurred and the act of
disinherison was executed during the interim period but the death of
the testator occurred after the new law came into effect. Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:2502 states that the new law is to be retroactively
applied. If the act of disinherison as executed would be valid under
the new law, then Civil Code articles 1617 through 1626 are to apply.
If the act of disinherison as executed would not be valid under the
new law, then the law at the time of the execution of the act is to
apply. If the blameworthy conduct that brought about the act of
disinherison was one of the eight just causes for disinherison under
the new legislation, then the new Civil Code articles shall govern. If
it is not, then the retroactivity provision directs that the law in effect
at the time of the act of execution of the disinherison is to apply.
However, under the theory that a forced heir could not be disinherited
during this period of lawless time, there is no law to govern.
(ii) Constitutionalrules
The .analysis now proceeds to the constitutional examination.
Would applying the new law to this scenario violate due process? At
first glance, it would appear that there would be no constitutional
violation to apply the law retroactively in that forced heirship rights
do not vest until the death of the testator which in this case occurred
after the new law came into effect. Hence, there would be no
divesting of a right because that right did not materialize until after
the new law became effective. On the other hand, because a forced
heir could not be disinherited during the interim period, it would
appear that to deprive the forced heir of his legitime would be a
violation of due process. This scenario is likely to be a controversial
one for the courts. Because the Louisiana courts still use the vested
rights test for due process, it is probable that this application will not
be found to be in violation ofthe constitution. However, there is also
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the federal constitutional question, which is to be resolved on the
basis of the "rational means-ends" test. The question arises: what
"end" is the legislature seeking to achieve by ordering this retroactive
application, if, indeed, that is what it is? Furthermore, are the
"means" chosen by the legislature rational? The Louisiana legislature
re-enacted the Civil Code articles on disinherison (with some
revisions) to reinstate those articles that had been inadvertently
repealed. (This is the "means" chosen by the legislature). The
Louisiana constitution mandates that the causes for disinherison be
provided by law. (This is the "end" sought to be achieved). Thus, it
appears that this retroactive application would pass federal
constitutional muster as the U.S. Supreme Court has only required a
standard of reasonableness and has stated that when this is met,
"judgments about the wisdom of such legislation remain within the
exclusive province of the legislative and executive branches."97
c. Case 3
(i) Basicrules
Case 3 presents the dispersion of facts in this sequence: the
blameworthy conduct occurs in the interim period while the act of
disinherison is executed after the effective date of the new law and
the death of the testator occurs after the effective date. The
legislature did not give a directive regarding retroactivity to this
situation in Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2502 because the act of
disinherison was not executed before the new legislation. This does
not qualify as a retroactive application of the new law in that both the
execution of the completed act and the forced heirship right vested
after the effective date of the new law, July 1, 2001 (with the new
articles in the Code allowing a parent to effectively disinherit a child
for just cause). Thus, there is no need to analyze the constitutional
permissibility of a retroactive application.
d. Case 4
(i) Basic rules
The three criteria required in order for Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:2502 to apply are not present in Case 4 where the blameworthy
conduct occurred before July 1, 1999 and the execution of the act of
disinherison and the death of the testator occurred in the interim
97. Krent, supra note 5, at 2150-51 (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.

R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729-30, 104 S. Ct. 2709, 2717-18 (1984)).
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period. Thus, there is no directive given by the legislature in this
instance. Nonetheless, to apply the new law to this dispersion of facts
would be a retroactive application of the law because both the forced
heirship right vested and the act of disinherison was executed in the
interim period when no law on disinherison existed. The right vested
before the effective date of the new law and an act was realized
during the reign of the old law (before the new law came into effect).
Thus, this qualifies as a retroactive application.
Having determined that this indeed qualifies as a retroactive
application, should the default rule presuming that the legislature did
not intend for the legislation to have a retroactive application be
applied? The legislation enacted in Act 573 is substantive because it
creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties, and powers of
individuals. Thus, the general default rule applies, and it is to be
presumed that the legislature did not want the new legislation to be
retroactively applied in this instance.
(ii) Constitutionalrules
For the same reasons given in connection with Case 1,there is no
constitutional problem in this case.
e. Case 5
(i) Basic rules
Case 5 presents the scenario consisting of the dispersion of facts
in the following manner: when both the blameworthy conduct and
the execution of the act of disinherison occurred before July 1, 1999
(when there existed legislation on disinherison) but the death of the
testator did not occur until the interim period. Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:2502 does not direct temporal application of this case.
And so one must turn to Louisiana Civil Code article 6. Applying
the new law here would qualify as a retroactive application ofthe law
because the forced heirship right vested during the interim period
when there was no law on disinherison. Likewise, the pertinent act,
the execution ofthe act of disinherison, was realized during the reign
of the old law. This was a completed act; thus, the application ofthe
new law in this case qualifies as retroactive because laws operate
directly on acts by assigning juridical consequences to them.
The analysis proceeds to the determination ofthe classification of
the law. Again, the new articles on disinherison are substantive law
because they create, define, and regulate the rights, duties, and powers
of parties. Because Civil Code articles 1617 through 1626 are
substantive law, it is to be presumed that the legislature did not want
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the new legislation applied retroactively in this instance. Thus, there
should be no disinherison of the forced heir in this dispersion of facts.
(ii) Constitutionalrules
For the same reasons given in connection with Case 1,there is no
constitutional problem in this case.
f

Case 6

(i) Basic rules
There is obviously no retroactivity problem presented when all
three pertinent acts in Case 6 (that is the blameworthy conduct, the
execution of the act of disinherison, and the death of the testator)
occur before July 1, 1999 (before the inadvertent repeal ofthe Civil
Code articles on disinherison). The analysis stops because there is no
intertemporal conflicts law problem. There is no need to evaluate the
constitutional permissibility of the retroactive application. The law
that would govern this situation would be the law that was in effect
through July 1, 1999.
g. Case 7
(i) Basic rules
Case 7 involves the sequence of facts in this manner: the
blameworthy conduct occurred before July 1, 1999 when there still
existed effective legislation on disinherison, the act ofdisinherison by
the parent was executed in the interim period, and the death of the
testator occurred after the new law became effective (after July 1,
2001). The legislature specifically gave a directive regarding the
temporal application of the law to this dispersion of facts: the law is
to be retroactively applied. Through Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:2502, the legislature commands that if the disinherison executed
during the interim period would be valid under the new law, then it
will be governed by articles 1617 through 1626 ofthe Civil Code, and
will be valid even though the act was executed during the period of
time in which no law existed. Thus, for the new legislation to apply,
the cause for disinherison has to have been one of the eight remaining
in Civil Code article 1621. If it was not one of these eight or if the
execution of the act of disinherison would still be invalid under the
new legislation, then Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2502 orders that
the disinherison shall be governed by the law in effect at the time of
the execution ofthe instrument. However, there was no law in effect
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at the time of the execution as it occurred during the interim period.
A forced heir could not be disinherited during this period of time.
(ii) Constitutionalrules
Under the vested rights test, Louisiana courts are likely to
conclude that there would be no violation of the state constitution in
this case because the forced heirship right did not vest until after the
effective date of the new law. Thus, there would be no violation of
due process for the law to be retroactively applied. Under the federal
rational means-ends test, provided that the retroactive application of
the statute is supported by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered
by rational means, judgments about the wisdom of such legislation
remain within the exclusive province of the legislative branch. It
appears, then, that this retroactive application would pass federal
constitutional muster for the reasons discussed in Case 2.
h. Case 8
(i) Basic rules
Case 8presents the blameworthy conduct and the execution ofthe
act of disinherison occurring before July 1, 1999 and the death of the
testator occurring after July 1,2001. A legislative directive regarding
temporal application was given through Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:2502. Paragraph A of the Revised Statutes states that if the
disinherison as executed under the old law (before July 1, 1999) is
valid today under the new law, then the articles on disinherison
enacted effective July 1, 2001 shall govern the disinherison. If not,
paragraph B commands that the law in effect at the time of the
execution of the instrument shall govern the disinherison. If the
disinherison executed in this case is not valid under the new
legislation, then the law in effect until July 1, 1999 would govern.
(ii) Constitutionalrules
Under the vested rights theory used by Louisiana courts, a
retroactive application in this case would not be in violation of the
Due Process Clause because the forced heirship right did not vest
until after the effective date of the new law. Furthermore, due
process is afforded through the retroactivity provision in that the
previous law is to be applied ifthe disinherison would not be valid as
executed under the new law. The same analysis discussed in Case 2
regarding the federal constitutional due process provision applies in
this instance.
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Case 9

(i) Basic rules
Case 9 is the situation that exists when none of the pertinent acts
occurs in the interim period. Rather, this situation is present when the
blameworthy conduct occurs before the inadvertent repeal (July 1,
1999) and both the execution ofthe act of disinherison and the death of
the parent testator occur after the effective date of the new law. The
criteria that the act of disinherison be executed before the new
legislation is not fulfilled so there is no directive with respect to
temporal application to this situation contained in Revised Statutes
9:2502. This would not qualify as a retroactive application of the new
law for the blameworthy conduct allowing such an act had to have been
one of the eight prescribed just causes in article 1621; otherwise, the
disinherison would be a nullity for lack of codal compliance.
Additionally, the forced heirship right vested at the death of the testator
which occurred after the effective date of the new law. Consequently,
the intertemporal law analysis stops because there is no need to inquire
into the constitutional permissibility of the retroactive application
because there is no intertemporal conflicts law problem in this instance.
j.

Case 10

(i) Basic rules
Case 10 presents the situation that occurs when the blameworthy
conduct which was one of the four eliminated takes place before July
1, 1999 (when, in actuality, this cause would have been a just cause for
disinherison under the old articles), the act of disinherison was
executed in the interim period, and the death of the testator occurred
after the effective date of the new law (July 1,2001). The legislature
has spoken through Revised Statutes 9:2502 regarding the temporal
application of the new law to this situation. The law is to be
retroactively applied. The disinherison would not be valid under the
new legislation because it was executed for a cause that was one of the
four eliminated. Paragraph B of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2502
states that the disinherison shall be governed by the law in effect at the
time of the execution of the instrument if it would not be valid under
the new law.
(ii) Constitutionalrules
Would retroactively applying the new law to this scenario violate
due process? The parent testator died after the effective date of the
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new legislation and hence, the property right materialized at that time.
Under the vested rights test employed by Louisiana courts, this
retroactive application would not be a violation of the Due Process
Clause. To reiterate what was explicated previously, a right is vested
when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the
property of some particular person as a present interest. Thus, there
is no violation of due process because the right of the forced heir
vested after the effective date of the new legislation. It is likely that
this retroactive application will meet the burdens of the federal
"rational means-ends" test for the reasons discussed in Case 2.
k. Case 11
"(i)Basic rules
Case 11 is similar to Case 10. In this instance, the blameworthy
conduct (which was one of the four eliminated just causes) occurred
before July 1, 1999 with the act of disinherison executed and the
death of the testator occurring after July 1, 2001. Because the
execution of the act of disinherison occurred after the effective date
of the new legislation, Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2502 does not
direct the temporal application in this instance. Because the
execution of the act of disinherison occurred after the effective date
of the new law, the just cause allowing the disinherison had to have
been one of those eight remaining in Civil Code article 1621.
Otherwise, the disinherison would have been invalid anyway for lack
ofjust cause. The death of the parent testator also occurred after the
effective date of the new law. Thus, this would not qualify as a
retroactive application of the new law. It is merely governed by the
law that was in effect when the act of disinherison was executed
which is the new legislation itself.
1. Case 12
(i) Basic rules
The dispersion of facts in the following manner comprises Case
12: the blameworthy conduct on the part of the child (again, which
was one of the four eliminated causes) occurred before the
inadvertent repeal; the act of disinherison was executed before July
1, 1999 (under the law that was inadvertently repealed); and the death
of the parent testator occurs after July 1, 2001. Here, no pertinent
acts occurred during the interim period. Parents who made
disinherisons in testaments prior to July 1, 1999 would have had at
their disposal four more causes with which to effectively disinherit
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their children than those that exist today under the revision of articles
1617 through 1626. Comment (b) to Revised Statutes 9:2502
provides that this transitional rule would validate disinherisons made
in testaments executed prior to July 1, 1999. The legislature
specifically provided that such disinherisons executed in testaments
in this dispersion of facts will be valid.98 The basic rules are used to
determine whether the legislature wanted the new law to be applied
retroactively. Legislative intent and direction controls this set of
rules. Thus, there is no retroactive application of the law because the
legislature has spoken to this effect. The disinherison is valid because
it is governed by the old law in effect at the time of the execution of
the instrument when there were four additional causes for which to
disinherit a child.
m. Case 13
(i) Basic rules
Finally, Case 13 presents the dispersion of facts where both the
blameworthy conduct ofthe child (which was one of the four causes
eliminated) and the act of disinherison was executed prior to July 1,
1999 with the death of the testator occurring during the interim
period. Again, comment (b) to Revised Statutes 9:2502 provides that
this transitional rule would validate disinherisons made in testaments
executed prior to July 1, 1999. Legislative intent and direction
controls the basic rules analysis. Thus, the execution of the act of
disinherison would be valid. However, the problem in this dispersion
offacts is that the parent testator died during the interim period when
a forced heir could not be disinherited.
(ii) Constitutionalrules
The forced heirship right vested at the death of the parent testator
during the interim period. The courts will be forced to decide if the
forced heir should be deprived of his legitime when the testator dies
98. It must be noted that the legislature obviously did not perceive many, if any,
cases displayed by the dispersion of facts in this manner in that Comment (b) to La.
R.S. 9:2502 states, "The likelihood of there being a testament with one of those
grounds is extraordinarily slim, since the grounds are very remote and there has
never been a reported case for any one of them in nearly 200 years." The comment
is referring to the four causes that were eliminated by the revision of the Civil Code
articles on disinherison. While the fact that none of those four were ever reported
in nearly 200 years is persuasive that this situation will not pose a problem, it is not
completely impossible or unlikely, however, that such a situation would not occur.
To the contrary, attorneys are occasionally (though rarely) approached by testators
inquiring about disinheriting a child for one of the very causes that was eliminated.
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during this period of time. The legislature specifically intended for
acts of disinherison executed in testaments prior to July 1, 1999 to be
valid, indeed, it has spoken to that effect. Nonetheless, the right
vested when there existed no law on disinherison. Under the vested
rights theory employed by Louisiana courts, it appears that to strip
this forced heir of his vested property right would be to violate due
process. This case presents competing interests-those of the
legislature versus those of the individual. In this particular instance,
it is likely that the Louisiana courts will find this divesting ofa right
to be unconstitutional and therefore will likely rule that there should
be no disinherison.
IV. CONCLUSION

One must take care to neither fail to appreciate the significance of
the law of retroactivity of laws (intertemporal conflicts law) nor
underestimate its complexity and its place in Louisiana's civil law.
As the preceding analysis illustrates, this body oflaw can potentially
affect any substantive area of the law and any number of rights, both
patrimonial and non-patrimonial.
It is the duty of the legislature to enact legislation that promotes
a civilized and just society. The law itself is the result of a balancing
of competing social policies. Louisiana's civil law composes a
portion ofthe private law. The Louisiana Civil Code was designed to
stand the test of time. It has performed beautifully. Nonetheless, the
mere passage oftime oftentimes requires that the law conform to the
social norm of a particular time. Medical and technological advances
are only two of many examples that effectively illustrate how the law
must sometimes adapt and/or change to apply to new situations that
develop in modem time.
The determination of the permissibility of the retroactive
application ofthe revision of the Civil Code articles on disinherison
will be best accomplished by the courts if they employ a hybrid
standard comprised of portions of both the "vested rights" theory and
the "theory of completed acts." This hybrid standard prevails over
either standard alone in that with the successions law problem of
disinherison, thorough analysis of the "vested right" (the forced
heirship right) and the "completed act" (the execution of the act of
disinherison) are both crucial to the determination ofconstitutionally
permissible retroactive application.
As the preceding analysis reveals, "[t]he constitutionality of a
retroactive statute depends upon a variety ofpolicy considerations."99

99. Hochman, supranote 14, at 726.
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In all retroactive applications, there are bound to be some losers.°°
While we are blessed to live in a nation that affords great liberty and
rights to its citizens, no right is absolute. Individual rights must be
weighed against the goals and objectives the legislature seeks to
further by enacting appropriate legislation in its quest for a civilized
and just society.
Scholars are correct in asserting that the entire area of
intertemporal conflicts law has long been due a re-analysis, both by
the courts and the legislature, in that it currently fails to address such
problems in a coherent, consistent manner.' O' The reoccurrence of
this area of the law demands that it be paid greater attention by the
Such
legislature, the courts, attorneys, and civilians alike.
comprehensive studies and analyses are vital if we are to accomplish
the smooth transition into new law while simultaneously protecting
the rights of Louisiana citizens.
Jackie M McCreary*

100. See generally Levmore, supranote 3.
101. Exactly how such is to be accomplished is, of course, for another time and

place. For now, applying a hybrid standard of retroactivity to the determination of
retroactive application ofthe new law on disinherison when the legislature has not
given a directive regarding temporal application will result in ajust adjudication of

the competing interests at hand.
* The author extends special thanks to Professor J. Randall Trahan for his
guidance and wisdom in advising this comment. The author also thanks him for his
encouraging words and support throughout the year.
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Chart One
Case

Before
July 1,
1999

Between
July 1, 1999
and
July 1, 2001

After
July 1,
2001

Retroactive
Application?

1

F
DIS
DEATH

2

F
DIS

DEATH

**

3

F

DIS
DEATH

N/A

NO

4

F

DIS
DEATH

NO

5

F
DIS

DEATH

NO

6

F
DIS
DEATH

7

F

8

N/A

DIS

DEATH

**

F
DIS

DEATH

OK

9

F

DIS
DEATH

N/A

10

FO

DEATH

**

11

FO

DIS
DEATH

N/A

12

FO
DIS

DEATH

N/A (disin.)

13

FO
DIS

DIS

DEATH

NO (no
disin.)

N/A = Not applicable; the application of the new law does not qualify
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as a retroactive application
F = Blameworthy conduct/cause for disinherison
DIS = Act of disinherison by testator
DEATH = Death of the testator
FO = One ofthe four causes eliminated from the list ofjust causes for
disinherison by the new law
** = The result reached will depend on the test employed by the
courts

